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SIC: SWITZERLAND’S NEW ELECTRONIC
INTERBANK PAYMENT SYSTEM*
Christian Vital and David L. Mengle
EDITOR’S PREFACE In the United States, bankers and the Federal Reserve System have attempted
to control risk on large-dollar wire transfer networks by means of quantitative limits. Net debit caps,
as the limit.. are called, restrict the extent to which an institution can incur daylight overdrafts on
Fedwire and net debits on the CHIPS network. The Federal Reserve is now considering additional steps
such as reducing caps and pricing daylight overdrafts.
In contrast, Switzerland took the bold step of prohibiting daylight overdrafts when it instituted its
new wire transfer system, Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC), in mid-1987. The following article, which
details the Swiss experience and approach to daylight overdrafts, should be an important contribution
to payment system policy discussions in the United States.
Of course, certain institutional features of large-dollar wire transfer in the United States are different
from those in Switzerland. For example, the number of participating depository institutions is far larger
on Fedwire (almost 7,000) than on the Swiss system (156). In addition, Swiss banking is far more
concentrated than is banking in the United States. But even so, the Swiss experience does suggest a new
alternative that could be considered for the future of wholesale wire transfer in the United States.
Introduction
In Switzerland, as in other countries in which the
financial sector plays a prominent part, banks’ funds
transfer operations are characterized by large values
and a high rate of turnover. An average of over
250,000 payments per day totalling more than 100
billion Swiss francs (=$68.5 billion)
1 are currently
processed through the interbank payment system.
The daily average turnover is over thirty times the
volume of banks’ deposits at the Swiss National Bank.
Until 1987 most funds transfers were carried out
through the Bank Clearing System developed by the
banks in the early 1950s.
2 Payment orders were
sent by means of paper vouchers and magnetic tapes.
* The article is an adaptation of C. Vital, “Das elektronische
Interbank-Zahlungsverkehrssystem SIC: Konzept und vorläufige
Ergebnisse,”  Wirtschaft und Recht,  vol. 40, May 1988. It is
offered here by permission of the publisher. Dr. Vital is
Director of General Processing and Back Office Operations at
the Swiss National Bank in Zurich. Dr. Mengle is a Research
Officer with the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
1 All conversions of Swiss francs to dollars assume an exchange
rate of 1.46 Swiss francs to one dollar.
2 See Bank for International Settlements (1985) or Lehmann
(1986) for a survey of the Swiss interbank payment system. At
the end of 1987, 342 banks with a total of 2,894 branch offices
participated in the Bank Clearing System. The remaining banks
executed their payments through the giro system of the Swiss
National Bank, through correspondent banks, or through the
Postal Giro System.
The orders were forwarded to the receiving banks
through a central computer center operated by
Telekurs AG, a company jointly established by the
banks. In the computer center, individual orders were
added up to arrive at credit and debit totals for each
individual bank; they were then entered in the giro
(or reserve) accounts of the participant banks at the
Swiss National Bank. (Banks’ giro accounts are the
equivalent of reserve accounts in the United States.
Funds in giro accounts do not earn interest.)
The transmission and processing stages of the Bank
Clearing System could extend over several days. This
created uncertainty in planning and monitoring li-
quidity and thus involved the risk of misguided deci-
sions. In view of today’s substantial volumes of funds,
such decisions could entail considerable costs.
3 Fur-
thermore, the system could not keep pace with
rising demands for bank payment services. Finally,
it limited the ability to integrate the banks’ in-house
information systems with the external funds transfer
system. Such integration was essential to stream-
lining the processing of payments.
The call for virtually lag-free information transmis-
sion and processing could only be met by resorting
to electronic communication and processing tech-
nology. And because it was a centrally organized
3 Fischer and Hurni (1988).
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seemed well suited for the introduction of an elec-
tronic funds transfer system. First steps in this direc-
tion were undertaken in the 1970s. Owing to cost
factors and unsolved conceptual problems, however,
the efforts failed to achieve their end. In. 1980 a study
group of large Swiss banks initiated a new project
under the name of “Swiss Interbank Clearing” (SIC).
The new system was developed between 1981 and
1986 by Telekurs AG in cooperation with the banks
and the Swiss National Bank. It began operation in
June 1987. The remarks below provide an overview
of the conceptual problems in interbank payment
systems, the solution designed for SIC, and the ex-
perience gained with the new system during its first
year of operation.
Interbank Payment Mechanisms
Gross settlement and net settlement systems Funds
transfer systems are susceptible to credit and fraud
risks as well as to operational risks. In interbank pay-
ment systems the magnitude of the value of funds
to be processed poses special credit risk problems.
In this context, it is useful to distinguish between
“gross settlement” systems and “net settlement”
systems.
4
In gross settlement systems payment takes place
by means of an irrevocable and final transfer of
deposits from the sending bank’s account at the cen-
tral bank to the receiving bank’s account. The pay-
ment act (the transfer of the payment medium) and
the settlement act (the transfer of central bank
money) are linked in these systems.
In the United States, Fedwire is an example of a
gross settlement system. Transfers of funds through
Fedwire are final, but executing a payment order does
not depend on the availability of the funds. Tempo-
rary overdrafts on accounts, also known as “daylight
overdrafts,” are on the order of $50 billion per day,
that is, about 10 percent of the average daily value
of funds processed through the system.
In net settlement systems the notification of pay-
ment received by the receiving bank represents a
claim on the sending bank. The claims are ac-
cumulated up to a specified time (for example, up
to the end of the day) and are subsequently settled
by means of a transfer of central bank money from
the net debtors to the net creditors. All payments
4 Not all wire transfer networks provide settlement of payments
among banks. The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunications (SWIFT), for example, only transmits pay-
ment instructions. Actual payments take place by means of
transfers of correspondent balances.
effected during the settlement period are made sub-
ject to the final settlement transfers. They are thus
also termed “provisional” payments.
In the United States, the Clearing House Inter-
bank Payments System (CHIPS) is an example of
a net settlement system. Payments made through
CHIPS are subject to the condition that at the end
of the day participants’ net positions are settled
through accounts held at the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York. Should a participating bank not be in
a position to meet its net liabilities, CHIPS regula-
tions provide for the reversal of all payments executed
in the course of that particular day affecting the
defaulting participant. If such a situation were to
occur, other participants might also become unable
to pay. To date, such an eventuality has never arisen.
If and when it does, the Federal Reserve System as
lender of last resort might feel compelled to come
to the aid of the defaulting participant by granting
it credits. Total daily net credits recorded in the
CHIPS system are of the same magnitude as the
daylight overdrafts in Fedwire.
The Swiss Bank Clearing System was also a net
settlement system. Payments made through this
system were settled several times a day via par-
ticipants’ giro accounts at the Swiss National Bank.
The accounts could be overdrawn during the day at
no cost and to a practically unlimited extent. In con-
trast to the CHIPS system, the Swiss National Bank
explicitly guaranteed settlement up to the limit of the
collateral held by Bank Clearing participants with the
Swiss National Bank. But the collateral, which
served as the sole security against losses, was modest
compared with the volume of daily overdrafts which
averaged 20 to 30 billion Swiss francs ($13.7 to $20.5
billion).
Risk aspects  Since payments in gross settlement
systems are final, a receiving bank may dispose of
the funds credited to its account without incurring
a risk. A sending bank incurs a credit risk when it
executes payments on behalf of a customer in ex-
cess of the customer’s credit balance. The central
bank runs a credit risk if it allows a sending bank
to overdraw its reserve account. As a rule, gross
settlement systems have permitted overdrafts that
are both free of charge and unlimited in quantitative
terms during the day (but not overnight). Measures
designed to avoid or limit overdrafts are a problem
insofar as they could severely disrupt payment flows
(given the large volumes of funds recorded in inter-
bank payment transactions). Further, such measures
could impose a cost burden on system participants
and thereby induce them to switch to alternative
funds transfer networks.
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payments are made subject to the condition that
settlement take place at a predetermined time, usually
before opening of the next business day. Despite this
reservation, a participant may allow his customers
to use incoming funds prior to settlement; the receiv-
ing bank thus assumes a credit risk vis-à-vis the bank
ordering the payment. If a participating bank is not
in a position to meet its net liabilities at the end of
a day, it may affect the ability to pay of other par-
ticipants, their customers, and ultimately the entire
economy. The risk of such a chain reaction is known
as systemic risk.
In gross settlement systems like Fedwire, finality
of payment is guaranteed in formal terms by the rele-
vant regulations and in actual practice by the central
bank’s money-creating powers. No systemic risk is
inherent in such systems because participating banks
do not enter into credit relationships with one
another. Any credit relations arising in gross settle-
ment systems in connection with the processing of
payments are overdrafts on reserve accounts; the risks
involved have to be borne by the central bank and
do not affect the other participants.
Elimination of systemic risk is a decided advan-
tage that gross settlement networks have over net
settlement networks. But the practice usually fol-
lowed in traditional gross settlement systems of allow-
ing overdrafts on accounts without penalty restricts
the flexibility of the central bank, as the extent of
such overdrafts can only be monitored and con-
trolled imperfectly. Moreover, gross settlement
systems lack the incentives inherent in net settle-
ment systems for a participant to take into account
the solvency of other participants and to reduce credit
risks by means of credit limits. It must therefore be
expected that the total amount of overdrafts in a gross
settlement system is greater than the total of net
credits in a net settlement system under otherwise
identical circumstances.
Regulatory measures  Balance sheets drawn up ac-
cording to conventional methods show the level of
assets and liabilities at the end of the day. They do
not show credit risks arising in the interbank pay-
ment system through daylight overdrafts and net
debits because they are only incurred during the day
and disappear by the end of the day. Moreover,
owing to a lack of suitable data such risks can only
be vaguely assessed in traditional funds transfer
systems. Accordingly, in most countries supervisory
authorities have so far paid little attention to such
risks. One exception is the United States, where the
question has been the subject of extensive studies
for a number of years.
5
In recent years the credit exposures observable in
the large-dollar networks increased to such an ex-
tent that they were considered a threat to the stability
of financial markets.
6 In 1986 the Federal Reserve
System therefore issued a policy statement requir-
ing Fedwire and CHIPS participants to use a system
of net debit caps to restrict any further expansion
(in quantitative terms) of the credit relationships
resulting from payment processes.
7 Moreover,
endeavors are being made to establish and ensure
the finality of CHIPS payments through rules that
require participants to somehow guarantee
settlement.
Main Features of the Swiss Interbank
Clearing System
8
Demands on the system In general, the introduction
of electronic systems for interbank payment trans-




creating optimum conditions for the planning
and monitoring of liquidity by providing real-
time information transmission and processing,
expediting and improving the quality of pay-
ment transactions, and
rationalizing the processing and settlement of
payments by means of large-scale automation.
The SIC system had a fourth goal: creating a gross
settlement system-a funds transfer system in which
each payment is made irrevocably and finally through
participants’ accounts at the Swiss National Bank-
that would guarantee a smooth processing of the pay-
ment flow even if no overdrafts were allowed on
reserve accounts. This would make it possible to
avoid the credit risks connected with overdrafts on
gross settlement systems or provisional payments on
net settlement systems. The solution arrived at was
simple: Do not release a payment that will cause an
overdraft until covering funds have arrived.
Account overdrafts can be the result of insufficient
reserve account balances in relation to the par-
ticipants’ volume of payments or a lack of syn-
chronization of incoming and outgoing payments.
5 Stevens (1984), Mengle (1985), Smoot (1985) Dudley (1986),
Humphrey (1986, 1987), Mengle et al. (1987), Corrigan (1987),
and Belton et al. (1987).
6 Corrigan (1987).
7 Belton et al. (1987).
8 Buomberger (1987), Granziol (1986), Lehmann (1984, 1986),
Meyer (1985), Müller (1986), SIC (1986), Telekurs (1987).
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tune of over 100 billion Swiss francs ($68.5 billion),
prohibitively high costs would be imposed on par-
ticipants if they were required to increase their non-
interest-bearing reserve account balances or to coor-
dinate the timing of incoming and outgoing payments
so as to prevent any overdrafts from occurring. The
experience of the United States seems to indicate
quite clearly that the problem of overdrafts cannot
be properly solved on the basis of caps or payment
coordination by participants alone
9. A less costly
solution might result if the funds transfer system itself
were to help solve the synchronization problem. The
SIC attempts to relieve participants as far as possi-
ble from the synchronization task by automatically
guaranteeing an optimum synchronization of incom-
ing and outgoing payments.
In order to take due account of increasingly
sophisticated customer requirements and to lower the
cost of each individual payment transaction, it was
further planned to send not only large-value payments
through SIC but also to provide for the processing
of a substantial proportion of bulk payments. Because
under these conditions a total of more than 400,000
payment transactions might have to be reckoned with
on peak days, it was specified that SIC should have
a settlement capacity of 90,000 payments per hour.
Components The requirement that each payment
must be settled finally and irrevocably on SIC im-
plies that participants’ clearing accounts must be the
reserve accounts managed by the Swiss National
Bank. But actual operation of SIC by the Swiss Na-
tional Bank would have meant a fundamental change
in the allocation of responsibilities among the banks,
Telekurs AG, and the Swiss National Bank from the
pattern existing in the Bank Clearing System. It
would have been impossible for the Swiss National
Bank to implement such a major project within a
reasonable time because it lacked the necessary
technical capabilities and experience. The major
banks and Telekurs AG, however, had gained
ample experience in the course of their own research
and development work. For this reason, it was
decided that SIC would operate on the computer
systems of Telekurs AG. The objective of adminis-
tering participants’ reserve accounts held with the
Swiss National Bank with the aid of this system was
9 “Since there probably are limits as to how far efforts to reduce
daylight overdrafts can go, the current daylight overdraft con-
trol program would have to be augmented by some combina-
tion of clearing balance requirements for major users of Fedwire
and explicit charges for daylight credit . . .” Corrigan (1987),
p. 31. See also Belton et al. (1987).
achieved by means of an agreement on the alloca-
tion of functions: Telekurs AG would operate the
SIC computer center on behalf of the Swiss National
Bank, while the Bank would manage the accounts.
10
The chief components of SIC are shown in
Figure 1.
11 At the center is the computer system
in which participants’ “SIC accounts” are ad-
ministered. The computer systems of the Swiss Na-
tional Bank and of the participants are linked to the
SIC computer either directly or by communication
computers.
12 SIC also has a magnetic tape interface
with the postal checking system permitting transfers
from postal checking accounts to the reserve accounts
and vice versa. Moreover, magnetic tape interfaces
to service applications provide for the processing of
customer-related payment transactions (such as check
clearing and cash dispensers) and for securities clear-
ing with traditional net settlement methods.
In accordance with contractual agreements, par-
ticipating banks’ SIC accounts take the form of
reserve accounts at the Swiss National Bank. In
addition, every participant has a traditional reserve
account which is administered on the computer
system of the Swiss National Bank and bears the
designation “master account.” Legally, both accounts
form a single unit and carry the same rights and
obligations, though physically they are managed
separately.
The SIC account is used for processing SIC trans-
actions, while the master account is used for all other
transactions (such as cash withdrawals). At the begin-
ning of a clearing day the Swiss National Bank
transfers balances from the master account to the SIC
account. At the end of the day the total debits and
credits on the SIC account are transferred to the
master account so the master account again shows
the full reserve balance of a participant. The par-
ticipating bank decides how the balance is to be
divided up between the two accounts. In so doing,
it must bear in mind that payments are made from
the two accounts only if there are sufficient funds
in the accounts. Transfers from the master account
to the SIC account and vice versa are possible at any
time during the day.
Processing of payments  SIC is a credit transfer
system. That is, it does not in principle allow debit
transactions. Payment transactions entered by the
Swiss National Bank on the instructions of a partici-
pant are an exception, but take place only in unusual
10 See Hess (1988) on the contractual basis.
11 See Telekurs (n.d.) on the hardware concept.
12 See Birchler (1987) on the communication concept.
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addition, payments for the special services shown in
Figure 1 are settled by debit transactions.
The planned volume of transactions makes high
demands on the processing capacities of the par-
ticipating banks’ systems and the SIC computer
system. SIC therefore provides a 24-hour service on
bank working days. Payment orders may be entered
around the clock, either through the network or on
magnetic tape, for settlement on the day of input or
on one of the following ten bank working days. Pay-
ment orders not due for settlement on the day of
input are stored in the “pre-value date file” and are
automatically executed on the due date. Settled
payments are delivered to the recipient through the
network, on magnetic tape, or on paper. The
magnetic tape and paper interfaces are reserved
primarily for backup purposes.
The processing of payments to be settled on the
day of input is shown in Figure 2. The payment
message entered by Bank A is first “validated” by
SIC. That is, the system checks whether the message
complies with the formal requirements listed in the
SIC standards, whether it has not already been
input (double entry check), and whether it is com-
patible with the master data stored for the bank. If
the validation result is positive the sending bank
receives an “OK” message and the payment message
continues to be processed. Otherwise the sending
bank receives an “NOK” message (not OK) and the
payment message must be entered again. Validated
payment messages are then passed on to the SIC
settlement mechanism. This is the central compo-
nent that automatically ensures synchronization of
incoming and outgoing payments.
A payment order is settled, that is, the account
of the sending bank ordering the payment (Bank A)
is debited and the account of the receiving bank
(Bank B) is credited if there are sufficient funds
(“cover”) in the sending bank’s account to be debited.
If desired, the sending bank is advised of the result
of the check by means of an “EX” or a “NEX’
(executed or not executed) message. Settled
payments are delivered to the receiving bank, which
in turn has to acknowledge receipt to the SIC system.
If sufficient cover is not available the payment order
is transferred to a “waiting queue” and kept pending
until sufficient funds have accumulated in the clear-
ing account as a result of incoming payments. Once
sufficient funds are available the settlement process
is initiated automatically. The sequence of settle-
ment is determined by the “first-in-first-out” (FIFO)
principle, that is, by order of input.
13 No daylight
overdrafts can occur.
It is possible that some payments cannot be
settled by the end of the day owing to lack of cover.
In such an event the payments involved are can-
celled during end-of-day processing and must be
entered again by the sending bank on the following
day.
The settlement of a payment is final and irrevoc-
able. The receiving bank can thus dispose of the in-
coming amounts without incurring any risk. But
unlike settled payments, payment transactions stored
in the waiting queue or in the pre-value-date file may
be cancelled by the sending bank at any time. The
purpose of allowing cancellation is to discourage
receiving banks from releasing pending payments
(similar to provisional payments on CHIPS) prior to
settlement.
14 That is, receiving banks are less likely
to allow customers access to provisional funds if there
is a possibility the payment could be cancelled before
settlement.
Inquiries A bank participating in SIC can monitor
any settled incoming and outgoing payments or
payments stored in the waiting queue and pre-value-
date file that concern it. Similarly, it can monitor the
actual balance in its SIC account and the balance in-
cluding any payments not yet settled for all valid value
dates. All information entered in the system is thus
immediately available to the participant concerned.
The Swiss National Bank has access to the same
information, but for all SIC accounts. For individual
payment messages, access is restricted to settlement-
related data (sending and receiving bank, amount,
date).
Daily schedule A SIC day begins at around 6 p.m.
and ends at approximately 4:15 p.m. of the follow-
ing bank working day. Between 6 p.m. of the first
working day and 3 p.m. of the following day the
entering of payment messages is not restricted.
At 3 p.m. “Cutoff One” takes place. Any payments
entered after Cutoff One for same-day settlement
automatically have their value date changed to the
next day. The sole exceptions are “cover payments,”
which may be entered until “Cutoff Two” (4 p.m.)
for same-day settlement. The intervening hour
between Cutoff One and Cutoff Two is intended to
13 The settlement mechanism described applies to all SIC pay-
ment transactions including payments between two branches of
the same bank.
14 Incentives of this kind are also reduced to a minimum by the
rule that payments are not delivered to the recipient immediately
after being entered but are withheld until settlement has taken
place.
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CONFIRM RECEIPTpermit participants whose payments have not been
carried out prior to Cutoff One owing to lack of cover
to procure the funds necessary for settlement. After
Cutoff Two only cover payments entered by the
Swiss National Bank are accepted for same-day
settlement until end-of-day processing begins. This
is a backup measure in case a participating bank is
not able to enter cover payments itself because of
technical difficulties.
At around 4:15 p.m. end-of-day processing begins.
All pending transactions are cancelled and the total
credits and debits on each SIC settlement account
are transferred to the master accounts. A new SIC
day begins at approximately 6 p.m.; the settlement
process for the new day starts with the transfer of
reserve account balances from the master accounts
to the SIC settlement accounts at approximately
7:30 p.m.
It cannot be ruled out that a participant might fail
to enter all its transactions for same-day settlement
prior to Cutoff One because of, say, technical diffi-
culties. Nor can it be ruled out that payments may
remain in the waiting queue due to lack of cover
until end-of-day processing begins. In either case
considerable costs may arise, both for the participant
concerned and other participants, in the form  of
interest on delayed payments. If the amounts
involved are substantial and if there is any possi-
bility of the problems finding a solution within a
reasonable time, a postponement of cutoff times and
of end-of-day processing will be considered.
Security and reliability measures
15 In addition to
measures for limiting credit risks, the architecture
of an interbank payment system includes measures
to protect against fraud and operational risks. In par-
ticular, operational difficulties can set off chain reac-
tions that may jeopardize payment processing and
therefore the timely fulfillment of obligations run-
ning into billions of Swiss francs. Understandably,
then, an interbank payment system must provide a
high degree of security and reliability.
There are two types of security measures to
protect against infiltration, falsification, and tapping
of messages by unauthorized third parties. First,
authentication protects message transmission be-
tween participants and the SIC computer by means
of a mathematical procedure that verifies the authen-
ticity and integrity of a transaction. Second, encryp-
tion is available to prevent messages from being
tapped. Encryption is not compulsory, but all par-
ticipants are advised to use it.
15 See also Walder (1987).
With regard to operational reliability, there are
backup facilities in the SIC computer center and in
a remote backup center to serve as standbys in the
event of failures of the SIC computer system or the
central network equipment. But SIC encompasses
not only the central SIC system, but more than 150
participant computer systems as well. While the
reliability of data processing and communication
facilities has reached a high standard in recent years,
a system with such a large number of complex com-
ponents cannot be expected to operate without any
failures at all. The robustness of the overall system
thus depends largely on the availability of suitable
backup facilities in the event of breakdowns.
If time were needed to recover from failures of a
participant’s computer system or of the central
system, cutoff could be postponed. In addition, any
participant who is unable to communicate with SIC
can resort to an exchange of data by means of
magnetic tapes. In the event of serious disruptions
provision is made for the Swiss National Bank to
input large-value payments or totals of payments




SIC was developed between 1981 and 1986 and
was subjected to extensive tests from September
1986 to May 1987. The introduction of such a
system could be costly and could involve high risks,
since it would not be possible to test such a com-
plex facility for every detail under all conceivable cir-
cumstances. Moreover, participating banks would
have to install their systems and have them function-
ing on schedule. Finally, the banks would have to
reorganize operational procedures that had become
firmly established over the years.
In order to limit the risks involved in the introduc-
tion of the system and also because it was hardly to
be expected that all participants would be able to
complete all the preparations and conversions by a
certain date, it was decided to introduce the new
system step by step within the space of a year. The
introduction was to be gradual in regard to both
number of links and volume of transactions. But this
led to the problem of payments accumulating on the
accounts of participants not yet linked to the system.
Potentially, this could cause settlement to come to
a virtual standstill. The problem was solved by re-
quiring that all “large” payments (exceeding one
million Swiss francs) be processed through SIC as
16 For a first progress report see Vital (1987).
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assumed responsibility for entering such payments
on behalf of any institutions not yet linked to the
system.
SIC began operation on 10 June 1987. During the
following months of operation the functional via-
bility of the overall system was established. If one
were to take into account the system’s complexity
and that its development meant breaking new
ground, the introduction may be regarded as smooth
and successful. As was to be expected, a few technical
difficulties did occur both in the central system and
with a number of participants. Each day, however,
the settlement books were properly closed. No con-
ceptual shortcomings were revealed in the course of
the practical operations of the SIC system. The
technical problems that did arise showed that the
backup plans provided the necessary immunity from
operational disruptions.
It was further revealed in the first few months
that the SIC settlement mechanism worked satisfac-
torily. Transaction volume fluctuated between 60 and
140 billion Swiss francs ($41.1 to $95.9 billion) every
day during that time. Even so, reserve account over-
drafts, which had amounted to between 20 and 30
billion Swiss francs daily in the old Bank Clearing
System, were permanently eliminated at one stroke
when SIC came into operation without causing any
disruptions in the interbank payment flow.
Experience since the Introduction of SIC
17
Participants and payment volumes When SIC began
operation on 10 June 1987, eight participating institu-
tions were linked to the system. On that first day,
13,300 payments totalling 80 billion Swiss francs
($54.8 billion ) were processed. By the end of
November 1988 the number of participants linked
on-line to SIC had risen to 156. (In comparison,
CHIPS has 136 participants and Fedwire serves
almost 7,000 depository institutions.) Further, the
number of transactions per day approached 170,000
and the maximum peak day volume had increased
to over 300,000 payments (Figure 3). But the ex-
pansion of average daily value of payments over the
same period seems less dramatic in comparison
because large payments, which account for the
major part of the volume of funds, have been exe-
cuted through SIC from the very first day (Figure
4). Still, peak day volume surpassed 200 billion Swiss
francs for the first time in November 1988.
17 The Appendix treats the subject of this section in more detail.
Figure 3
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SIC will completely replace Bank Clearing in
January 1989. If a bank not linked on-line to SIC
wishes to make a payment through SIC, it does so
through a correspondent linked to SIC.
Distribution of payment size While all large (one
million Swiss francs or more) payments have been
processed through SIC since June 1987, the propor-
tion of small (up to 5,000 Swiss francs) payments
has increased in terms of number of trans-
actions as more participants have been added to SIC.
In September 1987 small payments constituted
almost SO percent of transactions, but by November
1988 their proportion had grown to about 77 per-
cent. At the same time, the proportion of large
payments had fallen from 23 percent to about 5 per-
cent of the total number of transactions.
But in terms of value, only large payments are of
any importance. Further, the distribution of values
of payments has not changed markedly over time.
Specifically, in September 1987 large payments com-
prised about 99 percent of total payment value, while
by November 1988 the proportion had only fallen
slightly to just under 98 percent.
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On United States holidays, SIC payment volumes
in terms of value fall to levels of less than 10 per-
cent of average daily volumes. This shows that large
payments derive chiefly from foreign exchange trans-
actions. It also shows that comprehensive risk
analyses and risk measures must take into account
the interdependence of the various national funds
transfer systems.
Use of reserve account balances It is difficult to deter-
mine the effect of SIC on the demand for reserve
account balances because new liquidity regulations
took effect on 1 January 1988.
18 Essentially,
reserve requirements in Switzerland are now ful-
filled by banks holding cash along with deposits with
the Postal Giro System. Thus the deposits banks hold
with the Swiss National Bank are for all practical pur-
poses excess reserves. The results are shown in
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18 Birchler (1988). Note: Balances are monthly averages of daily figures.
Figures 5 and 6. The level of reserve account
balances held by SIC participants with the Swiss Na-
tional Bank declined from over 7.0 billion Swiss
francs in January 1988 to 3.2 billion Swiss francs by
November 1988 (or from $4.8 billion to $2.2 billion).
The ratio of daily value of SIC payments to the level
of reserve account balances (that is, daily turnover)
increased during the same period from approximately
twelve to well over thirty.
Changes in input and settlement times  Since the
introduction of SIC input behavior has changed in
favor of earlier times of input as additional participants
have been linked to the system and payment volumes
have expanded. Further, on 1 April 1988 a new
transaction price stucture was introduced. The
receiving bank pays a flat fee for each message
received, and the fee does not change during the day.
Figure 5
Reserve Balances of SIC Participants
July 1987-November 1988
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Turnover of Reserve Balances
of SIC Participants Per Day
July 1987-November 1988
Note: Turnover is the ratio of average daily payment value to
average daily reserve balances.
In addition, the sending bank is charged a two-part
price for each transaction, and each part increases
at specified times during the day. One part of the
price is based on time of input, the other on time
of settlement. For example, a payment entered and
settled before 8 a.m. would carry the lowest price,
while a payment entered before 8 a.m. but not settled
until after 8 a.m. would carry a higher price. The
highest price would be charged for payments input
and settled after 2 p.m.
By charging sending banks lower prices for
payments entered and settled early in the day, it was
hoped that participants would enter their payments
a little sooner and thereby contribute to improved
coordination of incoming and outgoing payments.
While the new prices may have helped the move to
earlier input times, settlement times have not become
appreciably earlier. In fact, as reserve balances are
reduced the settlement times are increasingly
squeezed toward the end of the day.
Speed of processing Outgoing payments have to wait
for incoming payments unless the bank synchronizes
payments in such a way that available reserve account
balances are sufficient for immediate settlement. The
“waiting time” is the intervening period between the
receipt of a payment by SIC and its settlement. If
sufficient funds are available to settle a payment, the
waiting time is about 30 seconds. If sufficient funds
are not available, payments can be stored in the
waiting queue for minutes or even hours.
The speed with which processing takes place in
SIC depends on the value distribution of the pay-
ment flow, the level of participants’ reserve account
balances, and the degree of synchronization of in-
coming and outgoing payments. Speed may be in-
creased for a given payment flow by raising the level
of reserve account balances, by improving coordina-
tion between outgoing and incoming payments, or
by exchange of intraday funds among the participants.
But such measures involve costs that must be
weighed against the advantages of a higher process-
ing speed.
In November 1988, approximately 30 percent of
all transactions were settled within ten minutes and
approximately 55 percent within two hours of
having been entered. This is a decrease from the
corresponding figures of 43 percent and 79 percent
a year earlier. More noticeable has been the drop in
payments settled within five hours of input. While
99 percent of payments were settled within five hours,
in November 1987, the proportion had declined to
about 85 percent by a year later.
In electronic funds transfer systems that execute
payment orders unconditionally, payments are pro-
cessed without any significant delays. In the SIC
system, in contrast, delays of up to a few hours may
occur. This is the price to be paid for avoiding ac-
count overdrafts in the payment process. Compared
with the Bank Clearing System, however, process-
ing through SIC is much quicker. Consequently,
delays have never been mentioned as a shortcom-
ing of SIC.
Payment gridlock Related to use of reserve balances
and speed of processing is the issue of payment
gridlock, a situation in which no payments move over
a system because they are all awaiting incoming funds
for cover. Gridlock becomes more likely as reserve
balances fall. The level of SIC reserve balances at
which gridlock becomes a frequent problem depends
on the number and value of large payments and the
input behavior of participants. The question is: Are
there incentives that prevent the transaction demand
for reserves from dropping to the gridlock level? If
not, then SIC could conceivably degenerate into a
22 ECONOMIC REVIEW, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1988system with input in real-time but settlement in batch
mode at the end of the day unless administrative
measures were taken to force participants to hold
sufficient reserves.
But there are factors that should prevent reserves
from dropping to levels that threaten gridlock. First,
since payments are not delivered to receiving banks
unless settlement has occurred, receiving banks and
their customers may exert pressure for higher reserve
balances. Second, the costs associated with the
squeezing of settlement times toward the end of the
clearing day-or, in the extreme case, the costs
associated with a gridlock-should deter banks from
allowing their reserve balances to decline to unsafe
levels. In addition, the Swiss National Bank’s lend-
ing policies and the way in which rules (such as delays
of cutoffs) are enforced will help shape banks’ reserve
demand.
Overall Assessment
SIC is a centralized gross settlement system
created to process interbank payment transactions
with no daylight overdrafts and therefore no systemic
risk or Swiss National Bank intraday credit risk.
Experience shows that the objectives of imple-
menting the system have been achieved: First, it pro-
vides an infrastructure that supports liquidity plan-
ning and monitoring in real time. Second, it expedites
and improves the quality of payment transactions,
Finally, it rationalizes the processing of payments by
means of the unretarded transmission and process-
ing of information.
Compared with the traditional Bank Clearing
System, SIC offers considerable advantages both
to participants and to the Swiss National Bank.
Experience has shown that at least in Switzerland
the main problem arising in connection with gross
settlement systems, the elimination of account over-
drafts, can be solved. Liquidity problems cannot be
avoided even with this system. It does ensure,
however, that in such cases the Swiss National Bank
has the flexibility to decide whether or not it wishes
to provide support as lender of last resort.
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APPENDIX: Survey of SIC Transactions
The growth of SIC transactions and of participa-
tion are shown in Table I. The large spread between
daily average volume and peak day volume is
attributable to the bulk payment transactions that are
concentrated at the end of the month. By November
1988, peak day value of transactions passed 200
billion Swiss francs. Table II shows that the distri-
bution of both number and value of payments trans-
acted through SIC has been very uneven. While small
payments have grown as a percentage of number of
transactions, large payments have predominated in
terms of value from the beginning of the system.
Tables III and IV give an overview of input
behavior and the settlement of daily SIC payment
flows from September 1987 to October 1988 in the
form of monthly averages of daily figures. Table III
lists percentages of daily volume in terms of the
number of entered and settled payments for various
times of the day. Table IV lists the corresponding
percentages in terms of value. The tables show that
Table I
SIC PARTICIPANTS AND TRANSACTIONS
July 1987-October 1988Table II
VALUE DISTRIBUTION OF SIC PAYMENT FLOW
(Proportions in terms of number and value)
Table III
NUMBER OF PAYMENTS BY TIME OF DAY
(Percentage share of total)
Note: Monthly average of daily figures.
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VALUE OF PAYMENTS BY TIME OF DAY
(Percentage share of total)
Note: Monthly average of daily figures.
almost half of all payments are entered before 8 a.m.
on the settlement day, either at night or on previous
days in the form of payment orders with pre-stated
value dates. But up to that time less than half these
payments have actually been settled. By 2 p.m. (one
hour prior to Cutoff One) over 90 percent of the
transaction volume and almost 95 percent of the value
have been input, although only about 70 percent of
the transactions have been settled.
Waiting time is the period between receipt of a pay-
ment by SIC and its settlement. Figures A. 1 and A.2
show percentage shares of the overall volume in terms
of number and value for different waiting time classes.
Since the processing speed observed during normal
working hours is of primary interest, all payments
settled before 8 a.m. are considered to have a waiting
time of zero.
Figure A. 1 shows that approximately 30 percent
of all transactions are settled within ten minutes and
approximately 55 percent within two hours of
having been entered. Some transactions may remain
in the waiting queue for several hours. The figures
for value of transactions are lower (Figure A.2). Pro-
cessing time for large payments is a little longer than
that for small payments. Note that the percent of
transactions taking more than five hours to settle in-
creased during the second half of 1988. This corre-
sponds to the decline in reserve balances held with
the Swiss National Bank.
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Time Lag Between Input and Settlement
of the SIC Payment Volume
Time Lag Between Input and Settlement
of the SIC Payment Value
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